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THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF WORK AND THE VALUES OF 
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
VALUES AND AssuMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw. By JAMEs B. 
ATLESON. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983. Pp. x, 
240. $25.00. 
HowARD LESNICK* 
This essay is dedicated to the memory of Edward V. Sparer, late Professor 
of Law and Social Welfare of the University of Pennsylvania, whose life 
and work enriched my own, in more ways than I can recount or recall. 
I. THE DECODING oF LABOR LAw DocTRINE 
The opening sentences of Professor Atleson's important new 
book, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law, clearly 
express its purpose and central thesis: 
The purpose . . . is to investigate the seeming incoherence of American labor 
law doctrine .... [Its] goal ... is to demonstrate that the decisions are inco-
herent only if viewed through the lens of the statute and its policies, the way 
in which lawyers tend to view coherency. Underlying American labor law is a 
set of rarely expressed values that, although illegitimate under contemporary 
modes of legal thought, help to explain the judicial and administrative deci-
sions reached. These values and assumptions predate the statute and can be 
found in nineteenth-century judicial opinions. 1 
In referring to "contemporary modes of legal thought," Professor 
Atleson has specifically in mind "the notion that disputes should 
be resolved in light of the stated purposes and policies of federal 
labor laws, derived primarily from their legislative history and in-
ferences from the text of the statutes."2 Within this frame-
work-the "received wisdom"3 that characterizes the work product 
of judicial and administrative decision makers and of most scholars 
* Distinguished Professor of Law, City University of New York Law School at Queens 
College. In different ways and at different times, Jack Himmelstein, Karl E. Klare, and 
Edward V. Sparer contributed significantly to the evolution of the ideas expressed here. 
1. J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW at ix (1983) . 
2. /d. at 1. 
3. /d. at 3. 
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as well-decisions are often criticized as irrational, insufficiently 
justified, inconsistent with other decisions, or grounded on empiri-
cal premises that will not withstand serious inquiry. Legal writing, 
although often aware of "unvoiced but operative assumptions and 
values" that fuel particular results, tends either to overlook their 
existence or simply to note that they exist. It is precisely because 
they are not part of the traditional mode of legal analysis that 
these "hidden values" tend to be reflexively set aside. Scholars "at-
tempt to fashion a new and more rational analysis which tries to 
accommodate the 'irrational' results with the received wisdom as 
well as possible."4 
What is at work in adjudicatory decision making, Professor 
Atleson contends, is 
a much more serious and deeply rooted phenomenon than simply whimsical 
or faulty analysis. In brief, it seems clear that many judicial and administra-
tive decisions are based upon other, often unarticulated, values and assump-
tions that are not to be found or inferred from the language of the statute or 
its legislative history .... The legal decisions, therefore, may well be 'ra-
tional,' but only because they are consistent with those hidden values and 
assumptions. 5 
The book develops the author's thesis in three dimensions: (1) 
illustrating its application in the doctrinal development of labor 
law; (2) articulating the uvalues and assumptions" that assertedly 
explain that development; and (3) suggesting the controversiality 
and historical contingency of those values and assumptions. 
Professor Atleson's work presents major segments of our labor 
law as exhibits in support of his thesis.6 His treatment of specific 
areas is suggestive rather than exhaustive, for reasons he articu-
lates.' It is obviously impossible, even in book-length treatment, to 
"prove" a conclusion based on several decades of reading labor law 
decisions. Suffice it to say (recognizing that a conclusion of two 
4. ld. 
5. Jd: at 2-3. The presence of "unstated but deeply held premises," Atleson reasons, 
"helps explain why social-science data is often treated as irrelevant." ld. 
6. Atleson looks at the law as it regards the replacement of strikers (Ch.l); the applica-
tion of the concept of unprotected concerted activity to sitdown and slowdown strikes, em-
ployee decisions to respect picket lines, and wildcat strikes (Chs. 3, 4); organizational activ-
ity on company premises (Ch. 5); strikes over safety issues (Ch. 6); the scope of collective 
bargaining (Ch. 7); employer actions burdening concerted activities, but motivated by non-
discriminatory aims (Ch. 8); and the obligations of a successor employer (Ch. 10). 
7. ld. at 3-4. 
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witnesses is logically no more compelling than that of one) that his 
reading resonates with my own. 8 
What are the values and assumptions that make coherent (if 
illegitimate) this body of law? The many themes that Professor 
Atleson draws out of the decisions may be expressed, I believe, 
within two fundamental, mutually reinforcing propositions: (1) It 
is in the public interest for private management to retain discre-
tion over the manner and goals of production; and (2) It is appro-
priate to view the work relation as a hierarchial one. 
Judicial deference to managerial discretion characterized the 
Supreme Court's first consideration of the impact of the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) on the right to strike. The Court was 
at pains to make a statement that was "designed to assuage fears, 
predominantly felt by employers, concerning the impact of the 
Wagner Act; it does not speak to employees or their unions, nor 
does it seem particularly concerned that the Wagner Act was 
designed to grant economic rights, and thus power, to workers."9 
Legal principles that seem to countenance threats to productivity 
or continued production/0 or to the mobility of capital,11 bear a 
heavy burden of justification in terms of statutory language or leg-
islative history. The way to protect the substantive interest in 
maximizing production is to protect employer discretion to choose 
how and when to maintain production. 12 
8. For two examples of specific critiques that are exhaustive and that, in my judgment, 
wholly devastate the legitimacy (in traditional terms) of the areas of Supreme Court work 
with which they deal, see Hart & Prichard, The Fansteel Case: Employee Misconduct and 
the Remedial Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 52 HARV. L. REv. 1275 (1939), 
and Oldham, Organized Labor, the Environment, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 71 MICH. L. 
REv. 936, 981-1002 (1973). One could, I am convinced, compile a catalogue of such works 
that, in range and persuasive force, would sufficiently make the case. 
9. J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 19, referring to NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 
U.S. 333 (1938). The same reassurance characterizes the Court's initial grappling, in NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), with the effect of the NLRA on freedom of 
contract and the employer's power to hire and fire. As Atleson states it: 
Do not fear, [the Court] seems to say, private ordering is still the order of the 
day except insofar as narrow incursions are required by the NLRA. The lan-
guage suggests not the development of a new mode of legal thought, but, rather, 
the staying power of the views of the past in limiting the scope of change. 
J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 113. 
10. J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 19-34 (replacement of strikers) , 50-60 (slowdown 
strikes), 97-100 (strikes over safety issues) . 
11. /d . at 124-35 (scope of bargaining), 138-42 (plant closing), 160-70 (successorship). 
12. The Mackay principle, permitting permanent replacement of strikers, does not rest 
on a finding that hiring permanent replacements is necessary in order to maintain produc-
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Second, the employer owns the business as well as the prem-
ises in which it is carried on. 13 While the employment relation is a 
contractual one, the "contract" (almost never written) is read to 
incorporate status assumptions that require employees to be disci-
plined, respectful, and loyal. 14 Looking at decisions involving union 
access to company property, the scope of protection under section 
7, and the duty to bargain under section 8(d), Professor Atleson 
perceives in the judicial work product a common conditioning 
viewpoint: "[E]ither ... the interests of the common enterprise 
are to be defined exclusively by the employer or ... there is sim-
ply no conflict of interest. " 111 As he explains, 
courts sometimes adopt a unitary view of the enterprise assuming common 
interests and objectives and shared values. A unitary view assumes that work-
ers acknowledge the legitimacy of norms they are actually defying so their 
action becomes a breach of promise. In a contractual sense, this view confuses 
passive acquiescence with active consent. Yet, courts assume that workers, 
needing jobs, acquiesce in an authoritarian structure regulating their work 
life. 16 
This hierarchical structure is justified by a view of management as 
the proper voice of the needs of the "common enterprise,"17 and a 
view of workers as often irrational and ignorant, ruled by "atti-
tion. Indeed, evidence that would support a contrary finding is deemed immaterial. See Hot 
Shoppes, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 802 (1964); see also J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 33 ("the basic 
value ... involves more than production-it is ... the recognition that employers possess 
the option to maintain production during strikes"). 
13. See J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 92-93 (organizing activity on company premises), 
133-35 (scope of bargaining). 
, 14. Id. at 87-90, 11-16. The requirement of subordination applies as well to the em-
ployee's relation to the bargaining and grievance processing structures set up by the collec-
tive agreement. See id. at 77-80 ("wildcat" strikes often held unprotected despite lack of 
real threat to union's representative status). 
15. Id. at 94. 
16. Id. 
17. Atleson points out that the rhetoric of "common enterprise" is used to imply em-
ployee obligations to the company, and not any converse duties. See id. at 92-96. Atleson 
concludes: 
[A]lthough some obligations are imposed on employers to foster and support a 
joint productive enterprise, there are no or few corollary obligations upon em-
ployers to recognize participatory interests of employees, at least beyond express 
statutory prohibitions imposed upon employers. The absence of mutual obliga-
tions of honesty and deference, however, simply highlights the basic message of 
the disloyalty cases-employees should demonstrate deference and the enter-
prise should be productive, a goal that, presumably, management will seek with-
out legislative intervention. 
Id. at 95. See also id. at 152-56 (scope of bargaining). 
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tudes, fancies, and whim." 18 
Professor Atleson adduces relevant and significant evidence 
that the prevailing set of values is not based on historical or organ-
izational necessity. 19 Even today, there exists no such "cultural 
harmony of values" as is ordinarily assumed.20 He makes clear that 
the values involved are not those expressed in the NLRA, but are 
those of preexisting doctrine thought to have survived the statute's 
enactment. 21 "Over forty years after the passage of the Wagner 
Act, the common-law notion of inherent worker obligations oper-
ates anJ often limits the seeming implications of federal labor 
law."22 The result, Professor Atleson concludes, is that "the insti-
tution [of collective bargaining] does not seem to have altered ba-
sic assumptions about the workers' place in the employment 
relationship. "23 
Professor Atleson's work is extraordinarily useful, not only for 
the content of his hypothesis, but for the methodological advance 
that it represents over the prevailing patterns of academic scholar-
ship in law. Those patterns ordinarily focus attention on either the 
clarification of evolving doctrinal principles-What is the "true 
rule" that decisional bodies are groping to articulate?-or the eval-
uation of those principles, according to criteria that are presumed 
to be uncontroversial as guides to adjudicatory (or, occasionally, 
legislative) decision making. Such an approach begs a host of fun-
damental questions, including those about the processes of deci-
sion making and the role of rational argument, about the range of 
permissible disagreement and the scope and sources of shared val-
ues. In Atleson's hands, however, "[l]egal doctrine is stressed 
18. !d. at 99 (quoting from Atleson, Threats to Health and Safety: Employee Self-
Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REv. 647, 701 (1975)); see also J. ATLESON, supra note 
1, at 97-101 (safety strikes), 129-32 (scope of bargaining). 
19. See id. at 63-66 (historical error of "implicit assumption that worker attempts to 
control the work environment [are] somehow novel"), 102-06 (twentieth-century develop-
ments were seen "as natural and inevitable, and prior forms of industrial organization were 
simply forgotten"), 123. 
20. !d. at 10; see also id. at 58 (" '[d]eep-seated community sentiments' are sometimes 
cited to justify results that reflect the views of only portions of the community"). 
21. See, e.g., id. at 62 ("whereas organizational rights are 'granted,' property rights are 
'preserved' "). 
22. !d. at 179. 
23. !d. at 180. See also id. at 20 ("an act seemingly created to radically alter economic 
power is used to institutionalize employer power"), and id. at 52 (" the underlying notions of 
American labor law have not significantly been altered by the passage of the Wagner Act"). 
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throughout the text, not as an end in itself, but, rather, as evidence 
of values and ideology, or, if you prefer, consciousness."24 The task 
that Professor Atleson has set for himself is to "unmask or decode 
labor law."2 ~ In my judgment, that task has the potential of open-
ing fundamental questions to examination and choice. 
Although it is clear that Professor Atleson does not approve of 
the legal development that he has examined, he is not explicit 
about the matter. He does say, at the very outset of the text, that 
the values at work are "illegitimate under contemporary modes of 
legal thought."26 His hypothesis may be that the "received wis-
dom"27 should be properly applied and would delegitimate the pre-
vailing values. Alternatively, he may be asserting that the prevail-
ing values and assumptions are wrong, normatively and 
empirically. The oblique and laconic quality of his discussion on 
this central question reflects the great difficulty that legal thought 
has had in dealing with values. The following discussion explores 
this problem in the context of these two propositions. 
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PREVAILING VALUE STRUCTURE 
The "received wisdom" is more open-textured than Professor 
Atleson describes it. 28 The "purposes and policies" of a major regu-
latory enactment like the NLRA are traditionally seen as set in the 
broader context of a preexisting value system. Although a new 
statutory regime alters the authoritativeness of that system to 
some significant degree, the new regime is not wholly discontinu-
ous with the prior order. 29 A sophisticated traditionalist could ac-
cept all of Professor Atleson's critique and deny the judgment of 
illegitimacy. Invoking the wisdom of legal realism, he or she could 
assert that, first, the policies of the NLRA are in kind as indeter-
minate as those of the common law, and, second, resort to "deep-
seated community sentiments"30 is the proper way to avoid the po-
24. ld. at 4. 
25. !d. at 181 n.4. 
26. See supra quote accompanying note 1. 
27. See supra text acompanying notes 3-4. 
28. !d. 
29. Justice Holmes' statement, in FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 
(1924), that he would be "loathe" to read a statute as authorizing an agency "to sweep all 
our traditions into the fire," has a force that is not limited to the avoidance of constitutional 
questions under relatively specific prohibitions. 
30. See supra note 20. 
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lar failings of a self-delusional pre-Realist formalism and an avow-
edly personal values stance. The former blindly insists that the 
statutory text and the materials of the enactment process do pro-
vide determinate answers; the latter undermines or abandons the 
distinction between adjudication and legislation, between law and 
politics. Each of the hypotheses that I attribute to Professor Atle-
son in the paragraph above falls victim (so our hypothetical tradi-
tionalist would conclude) to one of these failings: The first naively 
assumes that there is guidance, of the sort Professor Atleson would 
like to £nd, embedded in the text and purposes of the Wagner Act; 
the second simply asks us to make a wholly subjective decision 
whether to reject the prevailing values that Professor Atleson (and 
a few others, past and present) does not share. 
Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law is designed 
to answer, as well as to provoke, this charge, although I wish that it 
had made its answer less implicit. Professor Atleson and I would 
probably take common ground in framing an answer. First, regard-
less of the debatable quality of any particular decision or set of 
decisions as an articulation of statutory policy, or as a harmoniza-
tion of a statutory regime with preexisting value systems, the over-
all pattern unarguably is infirm. The NLRA may respect tradi-
tional rights of property and managerial discretion to a significant 
degree, but it can hardly be thought to have ratified the work 
product of nineteenth-century notions of contract and master-ser-
vant law. Professor Atleson concludes that "the inherent obliga-
tions and responsibilities of the parties have not markedly been 
altered by labor legislation,"31 and that the legal system limits the 
protection of the Act "whenever there are any legitimate institu-
tional considerations competing" with it.32 If these conclusions are 
correct, 33 the indictment is plainly well laid. 
Professor Atleson's broader point is that the pervasive cumu-
lative force of the prevailing values is significantly augmented by 
their "unexamined" and "unarticulated" quality. 34 The very belief 
that they are society's values, not simply the judges', and are 
31. J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 179. 
32. Id . at 78 (quoting Schatzki , Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation and the In-
teres ts of the Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 
897, 916 (1975)). 
33. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
34. J. ATLESON , supra note 1, at 4. 
840 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32 
therefore an appropriate input to adjudication, demonstrates how 
easily law can play a mystifying role-that is, can "make contin-
gent political and social choices seem inevitable and natural."315 
Professor Atleson disclaims an intention to address the function of 
law,36 but he plainly has a reason for seeking to uncover "hidden 
value structures underlying ... outwardly value-free legal doc-
trines or modes of thought. "37 I believe that his reason is to assert 
the existence of choice, inviting us to see that the values thus un-
covered are ones that we can choose to embrace, and can choose to 
reject as well. Though at different periods of our history these val-
ues have been embraced, they have been and remain deeply 
controversial. 
From here, there are two routes to follow. The first is to con-
sider the implications for judicial (and agency) decision making. It 
can draw either a "liberal" or a "critical" inference. A liberal infer-
ence sees the value of recognizing the contingent and partial quali-
ty of easily disguised values and assumptions as disciplining deci-
sion makers-at least, good ones-to wring their decisions free of 
values which too readily have been attributed to a statute or to 
society. It is, in short, to make the claim of value-free decision 
making more genuinely maintainable, less self-delusional.38 A criti-
35. ld. at 181 n.4. 
36. He therefore neither joins nor repudiates those whose efforts of "demystification" 
are avowedly designed to show that the "social functions" of law are to obscure the input of 
contingent values. Id. (citing Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the 
Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978), and Ken-
nedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness, 3 RESEARCH L. & Soc. 3 
(1980)). 
37. J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 181 n.4. 
38. "Value-free" does not imply a pre-Realist formalism, laying "the law" against "the 
facts" and reasoning out an answer. It refers to a disinterested search for those values that 
are embedded in the statute being construed, or in the community. Roberto Unger describes 
this view, which (in an avowedly uncommon sense) he terms "formalism": 
By formalism I do not mean what the term is usually taken to describe: belief in 
the availability of a deductive or quasi-deductive method capable of giving de-
terminate solutions to particular problems of legal choice. What I mean by for-
malism in this context is a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the 
possibility of, a method of legal justification that can be clearly contrasted to 
open-ended disputes about the basic terms of social life, disputes that people 
call ideological, philosophical, or visionary. Though such conflicts may not be 
entirely bereft of criteria, they fall far short of the rationality that the formalist 
claims for legal analysis. The formalism I have in mind characteristically invokes 
impersonal purposes, policies, and principles as an indispensable component of 
legal reasoning. [O]nly through such a restrained, relatively apolitical method of 
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cal inference is that the task is inherently self-delusional, that the 
entire distinction between legislation and adjudication is per se a 
mystification.39 Professor Atleson shows no inclination to take this 
route, to draw either inference. Rather he invites the reader to step 
back from an instrumental stance, which seeks to influence or eval-
uate decision making, to look at the question of contingent, contro-
versial values and assumptions in a more reflective spirit. 
III. THE CoNSCIOUSNEss OF WORK AND THE 
CoNsCIOUSNEss OF FREEDOM 
When we engage with the values of production, managerial 
discretion, and workplace hierarchy-and do so for reasons other 
than to consider their legitimacy as an input to adjudica-
tion-what happens? For many, a profound paradox arises. As 
Professor Atleson states, those values are deeply controversial. 
While many embrace them wholeheartedly, many find important 
aspects of them repellent, and their social consequences tragically 
unjust and destructive. At the same time, even to those in the lat-
ter group, there is a ring of inevitable "rightness" in many aspects 
of the traditional value structure. They seem to describe the world 
as it really is. Intermittent stirrings to act in violation of the tradi-
tional teaching seem hopelessly visionary and out of touch with re-
ality:w The result is a profound sense of alienation and resignation, 
analysis is legal doctrine possible. Doctrine can exist - the formalist says or 
assumes - because of a contrast between the more determinate rationality of 
legal analysis and the less determinate rationality of ideological contests. 
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563, 564-65 (1983). Cf. Lev-
inson, Book Review, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1466, 
1467 (1983) ("liberal legalism envisions [law] as a 'knowable' entity separable from the polit-
ical views of those who are asked .. . what the 'law' means") . 
I attempted to articulate such a method-which until very recently tended to be viewed 
as self-evidently valid-in Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1363, 1392-1410 (1962). Justice Harlan's labor law decisions not infrequently modeled 
this approach. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 394 U.S. 
369 (1969); Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Ry. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); 
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967) (concurring opinion). Judge 
Learned Hand, the jurist whose career best approximates the posited ideal, described the 
task of statutory construction as to "reconstitute the gamut of values current at the time" of 
enactment. Letter from Learned Hand to Harvard Law School upon the presentation of a 
portrait bust of Mr. Justice Frankfurter (1960), quoted in Lesnick, supra, at 1393 n.l55. 
39. For trenchant critiques of this distinction, see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLITICS 
88-103 (1975), and Gabel, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REv. 302 (1977). 
40. The labor movement, and working people generally, seem increasingly to share in 
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"when the choice between despair and illusion seems 
unavoidable. "41 
The dissonance suggests that the question must be addressed 
at a deeper level than one of the content of particular values. 
There is a consciousness of work that underlies and shapes our re-
sponse to questions of law and questions of values. The conscious-
ness of work is a set of ordering perceptions, priorities, and prem-
ises42 that answers the questions: What is it to work? What is it 
that a person is doing when he or she works? The answers are not 
simply some observed phenomena, but rather a social construct-a 
choice of some kind that human beings have made for a reason. 
That quality tends to be masked, however. The answers tend to be 
perceived as given; their content is initially implicit, and if made 
explicit tends to be regarded as self-evident and uncontroversially 
true.48 
There appears to be a mutually reinforcing, mutually legiti-
mating interaction between the prevailing consciousness of work 
the general allegiance to prevailing values. See J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 158. David 
Trubek perceptively points out how this allegiance is part of a "complex and contradictory 
amalgam" with conflicting perceptions: "[W]orking class consciousness is split between a 
concrete realization of injustice and inequality in day-to-day matters, and an acceptance of 
broad propositions about the necessity and justice of existing social relations." Trubek, 
Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism 50-51 (1983) (U. of Wis. Law 
School Disputes Research Program Working Paper No. 1983-10). 
41. R. UNGER, supra note 39, at 24. 
42. Duncan Kennedy expresses the idea of consciousness in law in these terms: 
The notion behind the concept of legal consciousness is that people . . . can 
share premises ... that are so basic that actors rarely if ever bring them con-
sciously to mind. Yet everyone, including actors who think they disagree pro-
foundly about the substantive issues that matter, would dismiss without a sec-
ond thought (perhaps as 'not a legal argument' or as 'simply missing the point') 
an approach appearing to deny them. 
Kennedy, supra note 36, at 6. Words like "world-view," "ideology," or "belief systems" are 
expressive of a very similar concept. See Cover, The Left, the Right and the First Amend" 
ment: 1918-1928, 40 Mn. L. REv. 349, 349-50 n.2 (1981); Gordon, New Developments in 
Legal Theory, in THE PoLITICS OF LAW 287-89 (Kairys ed. 1983); Klare, Book Review, Con-
tracts, Jurisprudence, and the First Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876, 876-77 n.2 
(1979); Trubek, supra note 40, at 21. 
43. For an excellent exposition of the hypothesis that an underlying consciousness is a 
social construct, see Delaney, Towards a Human Rights Theory of Criminal Law: A Hu-
manistic Perspective, 6 HoFSTRA L. REv. 831, 839-42 (1978). See also Gordon, supra note 
42, at 288 ("[t]hough the structures are built, piece by interlocking piece, with human inten-
tions, people come to 'externalize' them, to attribute to them existence and control over and 
above human choice; and, moreover, to believe that these structures must be the way they 
are"). 
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and the law. The following discussion attempts to give content to 
the prevailing consciousness of work, and then to what I will call 
an alternative consciousness, illustrating the interaction between 
the consciousness of work and the law in context at several points. 
The purpose of this endeavor is to make explicit the reality of the 
existence of choice, and of its systemic masking, and to suggest 
further that a focus on consciousness-which underlies both values 
and law-might enable us to begin to engage with the process of 
exercising choice.44 
The prevailing consciousness of work sees work as an exchange 
relation, the giving up of leisure, the expending of effort, in return 
for compensation (income, status). The ingredients of this con-
sciousness cluster around three sets of qualities: 
1) Since the work relation is a bilateral, consensual one, there 
is no right to work. A prospective worker has only the right to look 
for an employer. 
2) The utility of work is defined by the user, initially the em-
ployer (the purchaser of labor), but ultimately the consumer of the 
product or service offered by the employer. 
3) The meaning or value of work to the person who works is 
that it is a means toward self-sufficiency. 
Our view of the employment relation as bilateral and consen-
sual interacts powerfully with our notions of freedom and consent 
in the workplace. The matter can be usefully pursued in the con-
text of a simple, classic situation. Assume that an employer's pol-
icy is to employ only people who do not join a union, and that a 
statute forbids such a practice, making it unlawful for an employer 
to require nonmembership in a union as a condition of employ-
ment. In this state of affairs, who is free and who is coerced? 
Viewing work as an exchange relation leads one to find no co-
ercion in a requirement that an employee abandon either a job or 
the opportunity to join a union, and to regard as coercive a re-
quirement that the employer abandon a criterion of its decision to 
hire. That, of course, has been the classic response of the law. It 
was expressed with unparalleled clarity and commitment by the 
Supreme Court in Coppage v. Kansas,45 a case presenting exactly 
44. See, e.g., Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collec-
tive Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 482 (1981) ("[t]he mission of all critical social 
thought is to free us from the illusion of the necessity of existing social arrangements"). 
45. 236 u.s. 1 (1911). 
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this situation. Justice Pitney, writing for the Court, explained that 
[t]he term "coerce" [cannot be applied] to the mere insistence by the em-
ployer, or its agent, upon its right to prescribe terms upon which alone it 
would consent to a continuance of the relationship of employer and em-
ploye .... The evidence shows that it would have been to the advantage of 
[the employee] from a pecuniary point of view and otherwise, to have been 
permitted to retain his membership in the union, and at the same time to 
remain in the employ of the railway company ... . But, aside from this mat-
ter of pecuniary interest, there is nothing to show that [the employee] was 
subjected to the least pressure or influence, or that he was not a free agent, in 
all respects competent, and at liberty to choose what was best from the 
standpoint of his own interests. Of course, if ... the representative of the 
railway company was otherwise within his legal rights in insisting that [the 
employee] should elect to remain in the employ of the company or to retain 
his membership in the union, that insistence is not rendered unlawful by the 
fact that the choice involved a pecuniary sacrifice to [the employee]. 46 
To Justice Pitney, the employee's liberty is to choose his or 
her interest: the job or union membership. The fact that the em-
ployer forced the employee to make that choice does not transform 
liberty into coercion. The employer, after all, is free to enter into 
the employment relation or not, according to its choice, and this 
exercise of freedom cannot be branded coercive. It does not change 
matters that the employee's choice may in reality be a limited one, 
in that he or she may lack the means to choose union membership 
at the cost of a job. The Court, far from ignoring that reality, 
spoke to it eloquently: 
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will 
be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negoti-
ating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances. This 
applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and em-
ploye. Indeed a little reflection will show that wherever the right of private 
property and the right of free contract co-exist, each party when contracting 
is inevitably more or less influenced by the question whether he has much 
property, or little, or none; for the contract is made to the very end that each 
may gain something that he needs or desires more urgently than that which 
he proposes to give in exchange. And, since it is self-evident that, unless all 
things are held in common, some persons must have more property than 
others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of con-
tract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing 
as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the 
exercise of those rights. 47 
46. !d. at 8-9. 
47. !d. at 17. 
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This approach makes critical a distinction between private 
and public power: public pressure on choice is coercion, private 
pressure is freedom. Such a concept of liberty implies a correlative 
concept of equality. The Court observed that "in all respects em-
ployer and employee have equality of right,"48 that is, they are 
each legally free to enter into an employment contract. That being 
so, whatever may burden or otherwise influence their choice is an 
aspect of that freedom and not a denial of it. Justice Pitney's re-
sponse to Anatole France's sardonic reference to the majestic 
equality of the law, which forbids the rich as well as the poor to 
sleep under bridges and beg in the streets, 49 would have been that 
he was correct: So long as it is not the law that interferes with your 
freedom, you are free, and the equality that is the majesty of the 
law is the equality of legal right. Substantive inequal-
ity-"inequalities of fortune"-is neither ignored nor lamented; it 
is valued positively; it is a social good. 
In one sense, of course, Coppage is a relic of an earlier day. It 
has long since been discredited as constitutional law, and its prem-
ises have been apparently discredited as social policy by an im-
pressive array of legislation: the National Labor Relations Act of 
1935, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the employment dis-
crimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and similar 
legislation, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, and 
many others. Notwithstanding the great significance of these and 
other departures from the primacy of our commitment to freedom 
of contract, the premises of Justice Pitney's opinion-that are de-
rived from and continue to reinforce the exchange notion of 
work-remain the core of our ideology and the core of our law. 
First, the changes that have occurred are ideologically periph-
eral. The periphery may be extremely complex and significant, but 
it is nonetheless comprised of exceptions, each of which needs to 
be justified as a departure from the norm. Moreover, neither a par-
ticular regulatory program, nor its totality, is seen as embodying a 
fundamental rejection of freedom of contract as a primary social 
value. To the contrary, each regulatory program is explicitly re-
quired to be construed to respect the principle of freedom of con-
48. !d. at 11. 
49. A. FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (W. Stephens trans. 1910). 
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tract as much as possible.rso The pattern that Professor Atleson 
finds under the NLRA is thus almost literally preordained.rs 1 
The judicial reaction mirrors the legislative and societal pat-
tern. In each area of regulation, there tends to be a cycle of na-
tional responses: Dissatisfied with an aspect of the results of free-
dom of contract-discrimination against union members or 
minority groups, unemployment, occupational accidents or disease, 
or other social ill-we enact protective legislation in response. In-
evitably, we soon experience a feeling that we may have "gone too 
far." That feeling is sometimes expressed as concern over reverse 
discrimination or quotas, sometimes as concern over the cost of 
consumer products and the need to enhance "efficiency," some-
times in other terms, but the pattern is endemic. It is generally 
true, as Professor Atleson demonstrates in a number of labor law 
areas, that regulatory programs tend over time to narrow in scope, 
to lose much of their animating force. While general perspectives 
regarding this phenomenon may have value-the problem of "cap-
ture" of regulatory agencies by the regulated is often the focus of 
such perspectives-central to the process of narrowing is the fact 
that principles given force in regulatory legislation are inconsistent 
with the prevailing ideology. Although those principles draw their 
legitimacy from dissatisfaction with the results of the prevailing 
ideology, the ideology itself is not rejected, and continues to shape 
our response.rs2 
In that ideology, the idea of work as an exchange relation in-
teracts powerfully with our consciousness of freedom and con-
straint. Freedom of choice is seen just as Justice Pitney saw it: an 
employee trading off the benefits and burdens of his or her op-
tions. It is this framework that channels discussion of occupational 
health and safety, for example, into a focus on employee trade-offs, 
reinforcing the assumption that high-risk jobs pay better, and ori-
50. This process is reflected in a long tradition of judicial decisions, from NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), through (and beyond) Mount Healthy City 
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1976). 
51. For a discussion of this tendency in the iaw, see Stone, Legal Fictions, Monthly 
Rev., Sept. 1983, at 60 ("The law seeks to deny the significance of ... majoritarian inter-
ventions into civil society by claiming the occurrences are mere exceptions to the prevailing 
market principle. It attempts to keep the exceptions narrow and well-demarcated.") . 
52. See supra notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text for Atleson's discussion of the 
areas of labor law referred to; cf. Klare, supra note 42. 
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enting reform toward the idea of informed consent. ~3 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF 
WORK 
The expression of worker freedom of choice, once thus defined, 
is further channeled and cabined by the remaining ingredients of 
the exchange concept of work. First, the principle that the utility 
of work is defined by the user (again, initially the employer, but 
ultimately the consumer of the product or service made or offered 
by the employer) profoundly shapes our sense of what is right and 
proper in the job relation and in the law. Professor Atleson, in his 
examination of the fusing of contract and status concepts, has pro-
vided a significant historical explanation for the phenomenon that 
a legally equal consensual relation is usually dominated by the em-
ployer. 54 Other historical or theoretical explanations can be given. ~5 
But the phenomenon is inherent in the concept that the utility of 
work is defined by the user. The employee "fills the job"; he or she 
has a role defined by the job and does not own the job. 
This perception is so deeply ingrained in the law that, when it 
is expressed at all, it is regarded as axiomatic. One modern deci-
sion that grapples with the question whether to limit the employ-
ment at will doctrine is Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp. 56 Geary was a 
53. See discussion in M. HoRWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 209-10 
(1977). A recent example is Note, Occupational Health Risks and the Worker's Right to 
Know, 90 YALE L.J. 1792, 1801 (1981): 
The decision to undertake dangerous work in exchange for compensation is a 
basic life decision. . . . A free society respects individual autonomy in those ... 
areas .... Only the affected individual can judge whether the compensation of-
fered offsets the resulting health risk .... [C]hoice is not free unless it is in-
formed. Workers should have the right to know the risks ... when they accept 
employment. 
The possibility that disclosure may not be a sufficient safeguard for "workers with lim-
ited bargaining power" is acknowledged in a footnote. !d. at 1800 n.54. 
54. See J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 87, concluding that "there was no idyllic, free-
market period when employment relationships were" the product of agreement alone. 
Rather, the law fostered the "fusing of the employment contract with traditional master-
servant notions, thereby giving a legal basis" for dominant employer power. !d. at 13. 
55. For a powerful depiction of the social manipulation of "consent" to hazardous em-
ployment in the period 1870-1920, see W. Graebner, Doing the World's Work: An Ethical 
Approach to the History of Occupational Health and Safety (1982) (unpublished manu-
script). Graebner concludes that "the idea of choice ... was less a way of opening up op-
tions than of closing them off. . . . " I d. 
56. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1971). 
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salesperson concerned about the safety of a new product. He ex-
pressed his fears to his supervisor, who responded (truthfully) that 
the company engineers had cleared it. Geary was still troubled, and 
talked to his friend, a vice-president of the company. As a result, 
the product was recalled and Geary was fired. In the course of re-
jecting Geary's suit for wrongful discharge, the court considered 
Geary's argument that a strong public interest in product safety 
was at risk: 
Certainly the potential for abuse of an employer's power of dismissal is 
particularly serious when an employee must exercise independent expert 
judgment in matters of product safety, but Geary does not hold himself out 
as this sort of employee. He was involved only in the sale of products. There 
is no suggestion that he possessed any expert qualifications, or that his duties 
extended to making judgments in matters of product safety.67 
In other words, Geary's job was to sell the product, not to raise 
questions about it. But how did that get to be his job? The answer, 
of course, is that the company defined the job, and Geary agreed to 
the definition when he was hired. Geary was not hired to be an 
engineer. Geary was not hired to concern himself with the safety of 
what he was selling-whether his concern arose out of regard for 
the user, the company's liability or reputation, or his own self-con-
cept. If Geary in fact had any such concern, it was a personal inter-
est, like the contour of his lawn. He could read books on safety on 
Sunday, but unless his employer agreed to purchase that concern, 
it had nothing to do with his work. 
Employer definitions of the job need not be explicit. The law 
attributes to an employer a definition consonant with the underly-
ing concept of work. For example, in Elk Lumber Co./''8 one of the 
major exhibits adduced by Professor Atleson in support of his the-
sis,69 employees who reduced their work effort in an attempt to 
induce an employer to rescind a wage cut were held to have 
breached their employment contract, even though they had not vi-
olated any express agreement or specific direction of the employer. 
The National Labor Relations Board viewed it as "implied in the 
contract of hiring" that employees would "serve faithfully and be 
regardful of the interests of the employer," and that they would 
not be permitted to "select what parts of their allotted tasks they 
57. !d. at 171, 319 A.2d at 178-79. 
58. 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950). 
59. J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 50-53. 
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cared to perform of their own volition."60 
The final aspect of the traditional consciousness of work is the 
idea that the meaning of work to the person who works is that it is 
a meahs toward self-sufficiency. That perception makes it seem 
self-evident that there is no legitimate employee interest in the 
product, but only in the pay and working conditions. Professor 
Atleson describes the constriction of the law defining the scope of 
collective bargaining.61 For example, when unionized physicians or 
nurses seek to contract with their hospital employer over "quality 
of care" issues (sometimes by the pressure of a strike), the general 
response is that it is none of their business. It is the business of the 
board of directors, of public or private contributors, or of consum-
ers. Residents and nurses are in their job for what they get out of 
it, not what they put into it. 
The Geary decision also illustrates the point. The extent of an 
employee's autonomy is defined by the employer. The employee 
consents to the arrangement in taking the job. He or she legally is 
free to refuse to take the job on the terms offered, but that is the 
moment of choice. Once he or she signs on, and has not chosen to 
sign off, an employee continues to work on the employer's terms. 
The quality of the employer's product is none of the employee's 
business unless the employer has chosen to make it so.62 
60. 91 N.L.R.B. at 337-38. As Atleson observes, "the employer's expectation of work 
output is called a 'production standard,' a goal to be reached. Workers' attempt[s] to define 
the level at which they will expend energy, however, are called 'output restrictions' or 'slow-
downs.'" J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 51. 
61. See id. at chs. 7-9. 
62. Atleson's critique of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (holding that noncon-
tributory pension plans are not "securities" within the meaning of the Securities Acts) ably 
shows how the underlying perception comes into play even when the subject is undisputably 
within the zone of legitimate employee interest. Atleson observes: 
The employee, says the Court, "surrenders his labor as a whole, and in return 
receives a compensation package that is substantially devoid of aspects resem-
bling a security .. . . " 
... The Court, by finding it impossible to segregate an employee's invest-
ment from his noninvestment interests, overlooks the possibility that the entire 
compensation package is a return for the employee's "investment" of labor .... 
At base, then, the Court assumes that employees sell their labor in return for a 
livelihood, and even if, arguably, part of this exchange could be deemed an in-
vestment interest, such an investment cannot be separated from other more pre-
dominant noninvestment interests, such as wages. Aside from pensions, then the 
Court assumes that workers do not invest anything in an enterprise. Their labor 
is purchased like other commodities; it may be treated as a commodity and the 
labor power purchased is not an investment by the employee in the enterprise. 
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The idea that the meaning of work is as a means toward self-
sufficiency further constrains employee free choice through the co-
rollary notion that there is a moral obligation to render oneself em-
ployable. While there is no legal duty to work-in the sense that 
peonage and slavery are unlawful and delegitimated63-there is a 
moral obligation to be employable, to change one's self to meet 
what the market may require. That duty may involve training or 
education, doing well in school, or developing a skill. It may in-
volve motivation, getting up early, washing one's face and combing 
one's hair, and learning how to interview and prepare a resume. 
Some shortcomings may be a cause of scorn, others of sympathy; in 
either case one is obligated to do what one can to overcome them. 
Personal qualities that impair employability are regarded as a 
"frill." This idea has manifested itself in the law through the 
"lifestyle" cases involving men with facial hair, women who wear 
pants, and like issues. The law struggles with the legitimacy of 
such personal aspects, but they are viewed as personal, and the 
response suggested by the prevailing concept of work is that one 
who really wants a job will cut his hair, wear a skirt, or take other 
like steps when they seem necessary in order to be hired. 64 We see 
in this process the commoditization of the person in a very literal 
sense. It is graphically manifested in school: students dressing to 
interview for jobs, going to "resume school," omitting from their 
resume or their person those qualities thought likely to be unpopu-
lar with employers. 
The moral obligation to be employable implies that one unable 
to get the job he or she wants will take any job he or she can get. 
That is to say, one's willingness to take a job that is available is 
itself a moral test. There is much here that is central to the dis-
pute between liberals and conservatives over work requirements in 
welfare law, as applied to the issue of substandard work. The con-
J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 172. 
63. Even this statement needs to be qualified. The law of vagrancy, only recently disap-
peared from our legal scene, powerfully limited the principle that there is no legal duty to 
work, and concededly unlawful instances of peonage have been viewed as "simply a desper-
ate attempt to make men earn their living." Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 16 n.26 (1944) 
(quoting A. B. HART, THE SouTHERN SouTH 287 (1910)). 
64. It requires a powerful, countervailing respect for personal differences- like our tra-
dition of religious toleration-to stand against this response. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) with TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 53 (1977) (where the "stand" was not 
strong enough to prevail). 
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servative perspective for the most part tends to take the labor 
market as given, and expresses an interest in attempting to change 
the willingness of people to work in the labor market as it is. Presi-
dent Nixon said explicitly (as have other leading thinkers going 
back at least to ancient Greece): "[N]o work is without dignity or 
meaning [if it] enables an individual to feed and clothe and shelter 
himself, and provide for his family. "6~ The liberal perspective 
wants to say that there is something wrong with some jobs, but 
that response is delegitimated by the prevailing belief that the job 
is more or less given and that there is something wrong with a per-
son who does not want to take the least offensive job that he or she 
can get. As a result, the liberal perspective gets trapped into dis-
puting the assertion that poor people do not want to work at me-
nial jobs, and finds itself asserting that they do, that they are eager 
for work emptying other people's ash trays and cleaning their 
linen, a proposition that is not intuitively obvious. 
The prevailing consciousness rests on a world-view that denies 
that work can be made to be life-affirming. The "Curse of Adam" 
is a metaphorical expression of this notion. It was not by being set 
to work that Adam was cursed: "Cursed be the ground," Genesis 
says, " for your sake; in sorrow shall you eat of it; thorns and this-
tles shall it bring forth all your life."66 In other words, humankind 
will be cursed by scarcity and low productivity. Work will be just 
barely able to sustain life. That is the way it is, that is the way it is 
supposed to be; the only issue is how we deal with that reality. So, 
we see repeatedly, in the area of safety and health, the strength of 
the belief that it is chimerical to expect the workplace to become 
truly safe. This mindset is a powerful input to the law's response 
to the prevalence of hazardous employment, and to our response to 
the law. Professor Atleson describes, in critical terms, the way that 
t he law denies protection to employees who quit work over safety 
concerns.67 Our sense of injustice about such a law is blunted by a 
basic skepticism about safe work. 
Finally, seeing the value of work as a means toward self-suffi-
ciency reinforces the tendency in us to polarize-that is, to see 
65. Statement on signing Bill Amending Social Security Act, PuB. PAPERS 1212 (Dec. 
28, 1971). Cf. Hesiod, Works and Days, in THE HoMERIC HYMNS AND HoMERICA (H.G. Eve-
lyn-W hite t rans. 1959) ("Work is no disgrace: It is idleness which is disgrace."). 
66. Genesis 3:17-19. 
67. J. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 97-100. 
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only as antithetical-our individualist, competitive aspect and our 
urge toward cooperation and mutuality. It skews our response to 
that polarity toward the individualist pole, wherein all communi-
tarian pulls are experienced as threats to the self, and "fellow 
workers" are seen largely as competitors. Within the traditional 
model, it seems axiomatic that one's co-workers are competing sell-
ers of labor in a series of bilateral relationships or prospective rela-
tionships with employers. The fundamental idea of unionization 
was to break with that model, to substitute a collaborative for a 
competitive vision. And in many ways (if I may overgeneralize), 
the difficulty with much of what has happened to labor and to the 
labor movement over the past century inheres in the fact that it 
attempted to express a different model in the context of the pre-
vailing concept of work. The very attempt is delegitimated by that 
concept. 
The consciousness of union collective action, such as a picket 
line, is not that of a series of bilateral relations with an employer, 
but one of an interdependent relation from employee to employee, 
where employees pursuing their individual self-interest can choose 
whether to help or to hurt one another, and necessarily must do 
one or the other. They need not go separate ways thinking that 
they are necessarily competitors, and they cannot go separate ways 
thinking that their decisions affect only themselves. The union 
song, "Which Side Are You On," said this explicitly, the labor 
movement used to say that explicitly, and in our time Polish work-
ers seek to call themselves by their aspiration: Solidarity. 
The law does not recognize that consciousness. The lines it 
draws, for example, between peaceful picketing and coercive pick-
eting are drawn in a totally different paradigm. To the law, the 
only pressures on an individual's choice to cross or observe a picket 
line that are regarded as an aspect of freedom, rather than coer-
cion, are those impersonally generated through the competitive 
structure of the market, or those characterized as "social," such as 
ostracism. Picketing that seeks to trigger an individual decision to 
act as part of a collectivity of pickets is therefore legitimate only as 
it aids the individual to weigh those pressures or make that deci-
sion. Hence, the emphasis is on rationality, the dissemination of 
information, and the freedom to choose whether to listen. 68 An al-
68. Decisions often thought to reflect differing judicial attitudes toward picketing are 
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ternative paradigm would characterize freedom in less wholly 
privatized terms. It would view picketing as a synergistic interac-
tion between individual and collective will. It would assert that the 
establishment of a collective will is a legitimate function of a pick-
et line, enhancing the freedom of those who do not choose to join it 
as well as of those who do. In fact we have so little experience 
looking at picketing in any way but the traditional paradigm that 
we can barely begin to say where the line between permissible and 
coercive appeals might be redrawn. 
V. THE IMPLICATIONS oF AN ALTERNATIVE CoNsciousNEss 
An underlying consciousness shapes our notion of what is an 
issue-and the existence of that consciousness is not acknowl-
edged. This is not to say that the unspoken assertions are 
wrong-that, for example, the relation of work is not a bilateral 
one-but that they are only partially expressive of reality. Their 
implicit quality gives them a powerful effect on our perceptions. 
very much in accord with the view set forth in the above text. Chief Justice Taft wrote in 
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921): 
We are a social people, and the accosting by one of another in an inoffensive 
way, and an offer by one to communicate and discuss information with a view to 
influencing the other's acts are not regarded as aggression or violation of that 
other's rights. If, however, the offer is declined as it may rightfully be, then per-
sistence, importunity, following and dogging become unjustifiable annoyance and 
obstruction which is likely soon to savor of intimidation. 
Because Taft is known as a vigorous conservative and because the result in American 
Steel Foundries was to limit picketing severely, the opinion is usually remembered as the 
product of a restrictive era. The opinion by Justice Murphy in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
U.S. 88 (1940), in contrast, is generally thought of as high-water for the judicial protection 
of picketing. While these traditional readings are not inapt, the two decisions, and the ap-
proach of the two justices, are in significant ways more similar than different. Compare, with 
the passage quoted above, the characterization in Thornhill of constitutionally protected 
picketing as the "dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute." Id. 
at 102. 
Both judges view the question of the function of the picket line, and what it is that 
determines its legitimacy, in a very similar manner. Both visualize a work relationship em-
bedded in the contractual model: The employer is the hub; the employees are the spokes, 
engaged in a series of bilateral transactions with the employer. Individuals make individual 
decisions, before and during a strike, to work or not to work. A picket line constitutes an 
appeal from one or more individuals who have severed this relationship temporarily, as a 
means of changing it, to other individuals doing similar work, seeking to induce them to join 
in that effort. Both Thornhill and American Steel Foundries indicate that such an appeal is 
lawful so long as it is the offer of information and the making of a rational appeal. It is not 
lawful when it is dogging, importuning or an "enforced discussion of the merits," American 
Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 206, or "a breach of the peace," Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 105. 
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This implicit consciousness is reflected in the law at the same time 
as it legitimates the law. The idea that work is a bilateral relation 
makes it sensible to view the job as belonging to the employer. 
Indeed, this idea makes it sensible to define work to exclude non-
market activities such as the care of one's home or children. And 
the underlying "sense" seems right, not just in the way that a rea-
soned conclusion seems right, but in that the point seems axio-
matic. It hardly seems that an issue is being decided. 
The legitimating impact is reciprocal. The law made sense of 
by our consciousness in turn makes our consciousness make sense. 
I do not suggest that the law has a causal input here. It is not 
because we view work a certain way that certain things happen. It 
is more that there is a sense of dissonance being pushed away, of 
alternatives being pushed out of awareness.69 To his great credit, 
Professor Atleson has not allowed himself to suppress the disso-
nance. It is not accidental, however, that his critique is muted, his 
values position largely implicit, and his "legal" position focused on 
perceptions regarding statutory purpose and on invocation of prin-
ciples like even-handedness.70 Unless the dissonance is seen as re-
flecting a difference at the level of consciousness, and the partial 
quality of the traditional consciousness made the explicit subject 
of attention, its strictures will silently narrow the debate, in ways 
that predetermine the result. 
The completion of the process is the reification of social real-
ity, that is, the failure or refusal to acknowledge that our percep-
tion of social reality is a choice-a human product-that embodies 
a consciousness. The ultimate imprisonment is that which estab-
lishes the jail as the boundary of reality, and thereby denies its 
own existence. 71 
An alternative consciousness starts from the ontological reality 
that work is the expression of a basic human need. An alternative 
consciousness of work sees the prevailing concept as grounded in 
reality and as a partial view of reality. Work is more than the sale 
69. For a useful, brief discussion of the interaction between a "system of ideas" and 
"the actual structure of social life," see Frug, Th e City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. 
REv. 1057, 1074-80 (1980). For a succinct statement of the critical perspective on this cen-
tral issue, and some penetrating questions about it, see Trubek, supra note 40, at 45-48. 
70. See , e.g. , discussion cited supra notes 15, 20, 21. 
71. John Delaney has ably demonstrated how the reification of social reality is itself a 
reinforcement of the authoritarian, hierarchical aspects of the traditional consciousness. S ee 
Delaney, supra note 43, at 843-47. 
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of a saleable portion of oneself in return for self-sufficiency; it is an 
expression of one's energy, one's capacity and desire to be useful, 
one's responsibility and connection to fellow humans.72 
A recent embodiment of this alternative concept is the Encyc-
lical Letter of Pope John Paul II, On Human Work.73 The Encycli-
cal speaks critically of the traditional consciousness, according to 
which, "work was understood and treated as a sort of 'merchan-
dise' that the worker ... sells to the employer, who at the same 
time is the possessor of the capital, that is to say, of all the work-
ing tools and means that make productions possible .... "74 By 
contrast, the Encyclical asserts: 
[W]ork is a good thing for man .... It is not only good in the sense that it is 
useful or something to enjoy; it is also good as being something worthy, that 
is to say, something that corresponds to man's dignity, that expresses this 
dignity and increases it .... [T]hrough work man not only transforms na-
ture, adapting it to his own needs, but he also achieves fulfillment as a 
human being and indeed, in a sense, becomes more a human being.76 
From the perspective of an alternative consciousness, all issues 
are transformed, that is, are seen in a broader context. If one with-
out work is without an essential aspect of his or her humanity, 
there is a moral basis for a right to work. Marge Piercy's lines are 
apt here: "The pitcher cries for water to carry, and a person for 
work that is real."76 In place of the dichotomization of public and 
private,77 we would think it self-evident that they are mutually 
reinforcing and severally responsible. 78 
72. See, e.g., Klare, supra note 44, at 451 ("work can and should provide dignity and 
meaning to life ... it can and should be a mode of expression, development and realization 
of the human self'). 
73. PoPE JOHN PAUL II, ON HuMAN WORK (Encyclical Letter 1981). 
74. Id. at 17-18. 
75. Id. at 23. 
76. Piercy, To Be Of Use, in CIRCLES ON THE WATER: SELECTED PoEMS OF MARGE PIERCY 
(1982). 
77. See text accompanying note 47 supra. 
78. See Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358, 
1417-18 (1982) (criticizing the role that the "public/private" distinction plays in making the 
prevalent social order seem inevitable and unchangeable). 
Pope John Paul writes of the responsibility of direct and indirect employers; of a just 
wage, which can be paid by the employer or through social measures such as family al-
lowances; and of such related rights as insurance against old age or work accidents. "Among 
these rights there should never be overlooked the right to a working environment and to 
manufacturing processes which are not harmful to the workers' physical health or to their 
moral integrity." PoPE JoHN PAUL II, supra note 73, at 48. In all of this, as the Encyclical 
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Seeing the utility of work as not wholly external to the worker, 
and its meaning as more than a means toward self-sufficiency, 
would tend to legitimate the issue of work restructuring-the de-
sire to make the workplace consonant with the values of a demo-
cratic social order and a fully enfranchised citizenry, and to make 
work consonant with the values of the individual worker. 79 The 
dissonance that regularly prompts departures from the regime of 
the traditional consciousness would be recognized as a response to 
the deepest urges of the human spirit, and alternatives would not 
reflexively be seen as legitimate only as they can be accommodated 
to the traditional concept. The effect, in short, would be to legiti-
mate the effort to lift the Curse of Adam. 
Profound as such a shift would be in its impact on legal devel-
opment, an alternative consciousness of work would, most funda-
mentally, counteract the tendency to polarize individual and com-
munity. It would facilitate a recognition that both a legitimate self-
assertive aspect and a genuine concern for others are essential at-
tributes of our individuality. This fuller recognition of the meaning 
of individuality was given voice some seventeen centuries ago in 
the Talmudic aphorism: 
"If I am not for myself, who is for me? 
If I am for my own self only, what am 1?"80 
An alternative consciousness would see efficiency as seeking to 
maximize something more than the quantity of things that exists 
in the world, and freedom as something more than permission to 
compete with one another for scarce resources. 
Letter presents the question, it is the actual result, and not the structuring of the bargaining 
process alone, which determines its justice. 
79. See Klare, supra note 78, at 1387: "[T]he workplace is one of people's most impor-
tant learning environments." 
80. Ethics of the Fathers 1:14, in THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Order Nezikin, Tractate 
Aboth 8 (Soncino ed. 1935). A modern, secular expression of this thought eloquently con-
cludes B. AcKERMAN's SociAL JusTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 378 (1980). Roberto Unger 
seeks to demonstrate that "a necessary implication of the selfs attempt to retain its individ-
uality" is the struggle to transcend the paradox between its individual and its social nature. 
R. UNGER, supra note 39, at 217. As John Delaney expresses it: "The person may not be 
artificially abstracted from the various social contexts in which he or she achieves realization 
and meaning. . . . The individual search for fulfillment . . . is inseparable from the same 
quest of others." Delaney, supra note 43, at 853. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Professor Atleson's quiet questioning of matters usually taken 
for granted is designed, I believe, to invite his readers to discern a 
door in what is often seen as an unbroken wall. Following his invi-
tation, I have described what I see beyond the door-a space that 
ends in another door, through which I have looked but have not 
yet ventured. But the value of his enterprise is not dependent on 
the validity of my (or others') description of the space beyond the 
door. Truth inheres in the search for it, and scholarship has value 
as it encourages the intensification of the search. By those criteria, 
Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law is a significant 
milestone in the evolution of our thinking about law and the work 
relation. 
